The political economy of redistribution in Indonesia : political patronage and favoritism in intergovernmental fiscal transfer allocations / Gerrit J. Gonschorek.
- 作者： Gonschorek, Gerrit J. author.
- 其他題名：
- Routledge studies in the growth economies of Asia
- 出版： Abingdon, Oxon ;New York, NY : Routledge 2024.
- 叢書名： Routledge studies in the growth economies of Asia;153
- 主題： Intergovernmental fiscal relations , Patronage, Political , Economic aspects , Finance, Public , Fiscal policy , Local finance , Intergovernmental fiscal relations--Indonesia. , Patronage, Political--Economic aspects--Indonesia. , Finance, Public--Indonesia. , Fiscal policy--Indonesia. , Local finance--Indonesia.
- ISBN： 9781032299457 (hardcover): NT$4888 、 1032299452 (hardcover) 、 9781032299464 (paperback) 、 1032299460 (paperback)
- 書目註：Includes bibliographical references and index.
-
讀者標籤：
- 系統號： 005720300 | 機讀編目格式
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This book analyses how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public fund allocations in Indonesia. Presenting original research and investigating existing theories on the determinants of public fund allocations, the book uses Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia, often claimed to be characterized by money politics, provides an ideal setting for this analysis. The countries' decentralized fiscal system consists of various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs allocating public funds to a large variety of districts to finance public service provision. The author exploits those distinctive differences between various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs and investigates their influence on the prevalence of favoritism and patronage in public funds allocations while holding the political system, the observation period, and the government officials involved constant. A valuable contribution to the literature on the political economy of redistribution, this book will be of interest to academics working on economics and political science, particularly in public finance and development economics, but also in development studies or Southeast Asian studies.
摘要註
"This book analyses how different institutional intergovernmental transfer designs influence patronage and favoritism in public fund allocations in Indonesia. Presenting original research and investigating existing theories on the determinants of public fund allocations, the book uses Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia, often claimed to be characterized by money politics, provides an ideal setting for this analysis. The countries' decentralized fiscal system consists of various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs allocating public funds to a large variety of districts to finance public service provision. The author exploits those distinctive differences between various institutional intergovernmental transfer designs and investigates their influence on the prevalence of favoritism and patronage in public funds allocations while holding the political system, the observation period, and the government officials involved constant. A valuable contribution to the literature on the political economy of redistribution, this book will be of interest to academics working on economics and political science, particularly in public finance and development economics, but also in development studies or Southeast Asian studies"--
內容註
Indonesia's Intergovernmental Transfer System -- Patronage in Central-Discretionary Transfer Allocations -- Favoritism in Subnational-Discretionary Transfer Allocations -- Patronage and Favoritism in Formula-Based Transfer Allocations.